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Subjectivation and war: Marx and Foucault

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Today, we reread *Capital* under the theoretical conjuncture of the most heretical readings. These send us back and forth between the second and third volumes of *Capital*, the *Grundrisse* and the missing chapter that only became available in the 1960s. More importantly, we reread *Capital* after the ‘impossible revolution of 1968’ (impossible in its largely Marxist–Leninist grammar) and the neoliberal counter-revolution that followed, under the command of finance capital, in the context of a financial globalization that intensifies all the processes of capitalist reproduction in such a way as to demote what was once dubbed ‘late capitalism’ to the ‘later stages’ of an ‘early capitalism’.¹ All of us may also experience *Capital, Volume 1* as a ‘strange’ and ‘unique’ *locus solus*: namely, as the unique and exclusive trajectory that *reterritorializes* the reader of *Capital, Volume 1* from the dialectical exposition of the autotelic machinery of capital to the ‘matter of fact’ that capitalism is a concept in so far as it is a historical complex on a world scale – capitalism as a world concept. Consequently, ‘that process must have had a beginning of some kind’² – otherwise

1. Peter Osborne, *How to Read Marx*, London: Granta Books, 2005, p. 2.

2. Karl Marx, *Capital, Volume 1*, trans. Ben Fowkes, Introduction by Ernest Mandel, Harmondsworth and New York: Penguin Books, 1990, ch. 23, p. 714.

money could not have turned into capital in the 'never-ending circle' of an illusory liberal soft power supported by the intertwined concepts of 'exchange' and 'contract', as the basis of the market qua equivalence, equality, equilibrium theory, just price, and so on. If the critique of political economy shows precisely that 'capital is the golden chain the wage labourer has already forged for himself',³ the particular course taken by the analysis has to force the 'tearing apart of the object under investigation', and 'this', Marx insists, 'corresponds also to the *spirit* of capitalist production'.⁴

Force (*Gewalt*) is itself an economic power

In this very same spirit it is asserted that capitalist production not only produces commodity and surplus-value, but also continuously reproduces the social relations of production themselves. The worker is not only reproduced, but is produced in the first place, in a stage of real subsumption, including the 'reserve army', this population 'whose misery is in inverse ratio to the amount of torture it has to undergo in the form of labour'.⁵ And the latter increases with the potential energy of wealth and precipitates the 'absolute general law of capitalist accumulation', according to which 'the situation of the worker, be his payment high or low, must grow worse'.⁶ Well, then, if progress produces genuine misery and wealth destitution, if machinery is the capitalist answer to the strike and better wages, and increases absolute and relative exploitation, extensive and intensive domination, the whole of *Capital, Volume 1* on the commodity-form and its 'flirtation with Hegel' is somehow historically and violently drawn into the last part on 'primitive accumulation',

3. *Ibid.*, ch. 25, p. 769.

4. *Ibid.*, ch. 13, p. 443.

5. *Ibid.*, ch. 25, p. 798.

6. *Ibid.*, ch. 25, p. 799.

concluding with ‘The Modern Theory of Colonization’. To cut a long story short, one hundred years after Rosa Luxemburg’s reading of *Capital*, we have paid the price of learning that, in the centre as well as on the periphery, ‘so-called’ primitive accumulation is in fact the continued creation of capitalism itself: behind the extreme mathematical sophistication of finance and financial globalization, there is always the ‘brood of bankocrats, financiers, *rentiers*, brokers, stock-jobbers, etc.’⁷ described by Marx in the most ‘primitive’ context as the truth of the world market.

It is not by chance, then, that Marx finally presents here, in what Jameson still insists on regarding as a ‘kind of musical coda’ (‘History as Coda’),⁸ the properly capitalist systematic combination, one that includes ‘the colonies, the national debt [associated with the international credit system and joint-stock companies], the modern tax system, and the system of protection [of home-grown industries]’. ‘These methods’, Marx writes, ‘depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society.... Force [*Gewalt*] is itself an economic power.’⁹ Nor was it by chance that Foucault would find in the proceedings of *Capital, Volume 1* the very principle of a double colonization: the internal colonization of Europe and the external colonization of America mutually reinforcing, and together defining, the world economy, with the ‘sort of boomerang effect colonial practice can have on the juridico-political structures of the West’.¹⁰ Yet we also understand that if the genealogy of the techniques of discipline and biopower is to be traced back to the ‘launch’ of primitive accumulation, then by the same token the history, functioning and successive biopolitical transformations

7. *Ibid.*, ch. 31, p. 920.

8. Fredric Jameson, *Representing Capital: A Commentary on Volume One*, London: Verso, 2011, ch. 3, ‘History as Coda’, p. 74.

9. Marx, *Capital, Volume 1*, ch. 31, pp. 915–16.

10. Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’: *Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976*, New York: Picador, 1997, Lecture of 4 February 1976, p. 103.

of these power apparatuses (*dispositifs*) cannot be separated from war in all of its forms – military and colonial wars, wars of class(es), race(s) and sex(es) – because, in large part, it was war that created them. In the different modalities they take on from the end of the seventeenth century, these apparatuses (*dispositifs*) are the privileged way to express the continuation of war by other means and to make war appear as an analyser of power relationships.

This logic is at play in Foucault's 1976 lecture series, when he does not reverse Clausewitz's formula (as it is all too often said) but postulates on the contrary that it was Clausewitz who reversed 'a principle that existed long before ... a sort of thesis that had been in circulation since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and which was both diffuse and specific'.¹¹ If this led Foucault to study the appearance and diffusion of a discourse that for the first time conceived of politics as the continuation of war, in doing so he would end up mobilizing *against Marx* something that Marx had located at the centre of his *Communist Manifesto*: namely, the idea of an irreconcilable antagonism – that is, class struggle – as a 'more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society', an antagonism Marx would then reintroduce at the heart of *Capital, Volume 1*, chapter 10, in the factory, 'between [formally] equal rights [as regards the dimensions of the working day], force [*Gewalt*] decides'.¹² If this confirms that 'Force [*Gewalt*] is itself an economic power', since it determines the division between surplus-value and wages as 'independent variables which set limits to one another'¹³ (this is the very place, by the way, where Negri 'learned to do politics'¹⁴), and if it shows that, with its semantic extension in German that

11. Ibid., Lecture of 21 January 1976, p. 48.

12. Marx, *Capital, Volume 1*, ch. 10, p. 344.

13. Karl Marx, *Capital: Volume 3*, trans. David Fernbach, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991, Part V, ch. 22, p. 486.

14. Antonio Negri, 'Why Marx?' (2013), in *Marx and Foucault*, trans. Ed Emery, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017, p. 21.

articulates 'violence' and 'power' with the commission of violence by an institution (*potestas*) which is invariably the state, then *Gewalt* may circulate in a rather uncontrollable way between politics and economics. *Gewalt* is above all the element of a dialectical negativity that expresses, ultimately, the reversal of domination into revolution, and the acceleration of the course of history, as history of the universal emancipation undertaken by the 'only revolutionary class'. The industrial proletariat is in itself the historical subject of the tendency towards the socialization of production and the constitution of a 'collective worker', a tendency considered as necessary as a *Naturprozess*, in *Capital*, Volume 1, chapter 32, 'The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation'.¹⁵

Now, we'll all agree on this point: there is no natural war. That's why we can only confirm (to better divert) this observation from Balibar: Marxism could not construct a *concept* of war, but it is certainly a *problem*,¹⁶ since the point of departure for rethinking the entire history of capitalism – even in its most contemporary forms – is the close, constitutive, ontological relationship between the most deterritorialized form of capital (money) and the most deterritorialized form of sovereignty (war). And it is precisely because the reversibility of war and economy is at the very basis of capitalism, that 'wars' (and not *the* war, which is always the perspective of the state) are the foundation of internal and external order, the organizing principle of society under capitalism. Conversely, wars – not only wars of class, but also military, civil, sex and race wars – are integrated so constitutively in its analysis that *Das Kapital* ought to be rewritten on the basis of its last section in order to account for their dynamic in its most real functioning. At all of the major turning points

15. Marx, *Capital*, Volume 1, ch. 32, p. 929: 'capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a natural process, its own negation'.

16. Etienne Balibar, 'Marxism and War', *Radical Philosophy* 160 (March/April 2010), p. 9, www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/article/marxism-and-war.

in capitalism, we do not find Schumpeter's 'creative destruction', carried out by entrepreneurial innovation, but always the enterprise of a mutant multiplicity of military and civil wars.

With financial capitalism, what imposes itself is the contemporaneity of 'primitive accumulation', of dispossession and exploitation acting under cover of 'trade' (*le doux commerce*¹⁷) with the most modern productive/destructive processes. The true war machine of capital is financialization, of which 'industrial' capital is only a component, now completely restructured and subordinate to the demands of (so-called) 'fictive' capital. Leaving aside the political question raised by the hegemony of financial capital, in other words, the impossibility of distinguishing between accumulation by exploitation and 'accumulation by dispossession' (David Harvey) is equivalent to the inability to acknowledge the constitutive war of/in the economy.¹⁸

It is definitively no longer a question of a reversal of the formula 'politics as the continuation of war by other means', but of an interweaving of war in politics and politics in war adopted by the movements of capital in its permanent confrontations with a whole variety of struggles. Politics is no longer, as in Clausewitz, the politics of the state, but a politics of the financialized economy interwoven with the multiplicity of wars that drive and hold together the active war of destruction with wars of class, race, sex and wars of subjectivity that provide the global 'environment' of all the others. Are we not living in the time of the subjectivation of civil wars?

In the next section, we show that the irreducibility of social warfare to a class struggle that dialectically pacifies it is a condition for the analysis of political power as war. We will develop this movement within and against Foucault: governmentality does not replace war. Governmentality organizes, governs and

17. I.e. 'the peaceful commerce' in the English translation of ch. 31.

18. David Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 164.

controls the reversibility of wars and power. This is a reversibility that lends new significance to the difference in nature Foucault proposes between relationships of power (disciplinary, security and governmentality relationships) and strategic confrontations.¹⁹

To really escape from Hegel...

In the first volume of *Capital*, Marx defines capital as a contradictory social relation. Contradiction implies that antagonism is included in or immanent to the relation, but also designates the effacing of the 'difference' between the two terms of the relation in the labour of the negative and the teleology which, in Marxism, follows from it. The working class and capital are opposed in virtue of their very relation, their belonging to a common world that is in dispute within this relation. The working class and capital are installed on the same plane and constrained to assume a common measure, labour, which is the basis of their struggle as they dispute its identity or non-identity: living labour versus dead labour. The principle that operates this antagonistic homogenization is that of the dialectic. Hence the contradiction is haunted by the annulling of the language of alterity in the negation of the negation that brings forth history as the internal product of a dynamic – a contradictory dynamic – that tends toward its own reversal. Is not capital *in itself* a 'self-destructive contradiction'?²⁰

Here we appropriate, however schematically, an insight that brings us face to face with *la pensée 68* as a whole, for it is in '68 that the non-dialectical character of the conflict, the 'unsublatable' nature of its differences, is affirmed as the crucible of all

19. Cf. Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power' (1982), in *Essential Works of Foucault (1954–1984)*, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, London: Penguin Books, 2002, p. 346.

20. Marx, *Capital, Volume 1*, ch. 19, p. 676.

new historical forms/forces. At the beginning of the 1970s, indeed, it was the break with dialectics that led to the emergence of that which it had forestalled: the question of war and of the strategic confrontation between adversaries.

It is 1971. In a volume published in homage to Jean Hyppolite, Michel Foucault turns to Nietzsche in his first attempt to thematize war as a cipher for the social relation. In order to do so, he defines domination not as a relation but, on the contrary, as a 'non-relation', a distribution of forces – the dominant and the dominated – staged in a 'non-place [*non-lieu*]'.²¹ The 'non-relation' is a pure distance, a gulf between forces. The fact that domination is at once a non-relation and a 'drama ... staged in [a] non-place' means that the dominant and the dominated do not belong to the same world, to the same space. It is dialectics that reduces the absolute difference and heterogeneity of domination to a conflict between homogeneous instances. Now, what Foucault will call later 'governmentality' is precisely the device by which a non-relation as relation between adversaries is reduced to a 'pacified' antagonism between governor and governed, through the imposition 'of rules, obligations, and rights'. The universe of rules permits the game of domination to be continually replayed: the rule is not the manifestation of a shared world, but a 'meticulously repeated ... violence'.²²

Extending this critique of the dialectic of capital (a critique of the dialectical conception of capital by the very concept of capitalism in its concrete abstraction), we can see that capital is not only an exploitative social relation, but also, and indissolubly, a strategic relation of war. Capital acts on both planes at once, shifting from one to the other. Contrary to what Foucault

21. Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' (1971), in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow, London: Penguin Books, 1984, p. 85.

22. *Ibid.*

tells us, the establishing of governmentality does not do away with war, but continues it by other means. Any definition of conflict and of the process of subjectivation it implies must set out from the strategic articulation of capital, which unfolds as both 'relation' *and* 'non-relation', as both governmentality *and* war.

War, or the strategy of confrontation between adversaries, can become a relation of power between governors and governed because relatively stable mechanisms (*dispositifs*, rules, laws) enable institutions to steer the behaviours of the governed with sufficient certainty and predictability. But, as Foucault argues in 'The Subject and Power', every power relationship between governors and governed is liable to give rise to new strategic confrontations, and thus to transform the governed into adversaries, setting in motion a potential reversal of the situation. This is what happened at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s: the politico-military victory of the USA following the Second World War made it possible to establish new power relationships within which a new generation of conflicts would develop, setting the scene for new strategic confrontations: the strange revolution of 1968. We must therefore carefully distinguish the conflicts, freedoms and subjectivities implied by power relationships (governmentality) from those implied by strategic confrontations. The 'conflicts', 'subjectivities' and 'freedoms' are not the same in the two cases.

The power relationships between governors and governed imply 'freedom' for both terms of the relation. The vanquished can only be transformed into the governed if one recognizes in them a 'freedom', a possibility of 'resisting' (Foucault) or a possibility of 'flight' (Deleuze and Guattari), which in reality is incorporated into the governmental mode of functioning. Conflict, freedom and subjectivity within governmentality are defined by the limits of the 'within-against': the governed are

'free' either because they enjoy a fabricated freedom encouraged and incited by those in power (that of 'free labour', of the 'free consumer', the 'free voter'), or because they see themselves as 'free' in and for the war against liberal 'liberties'. The first is a conceded and negotiated freedom; the second is a hard-won freedom.

The capitalism of the New Deal and, in its wake, the Cold War created new freedoms ('freedom of labour, freedom of consumption, political freedom') above and beyond those of classical liberalism, in order to exit from the economic war (following the 1929 crash), from the political war with communism, and from the war between imperialisms. With the Cold War as a new technology of control of the world economy, these new freedoms would be generalized (in the countries of the North) thanks to the politico-military victory over the communist revolution. This also explains why most of the planet remained under the yoke of neocolonial policies carried out by those same countries that 'created new freedoms'. The transition to governmentality did not really take place in a (post)colonial situation. The colonizers and the colonized remained enemies; they never participated in the 'same world', even when the 'blacks dreamed of being white', as Fanon says. It is these 'details' that Foucault forgets when he analyses (neo)liberalism.²³ And the same goes for Tronti's operatism.

The conflicts proper to governmentality and its 'freedom' are not enough to define the autonomy and independence of political movements. They constitute necessary, but not sufficient, conditions, because autonomy and independence presuppose a rupture and a subjectivation, a 'subjective rupture' (*coupure subjective*) that will allow the 'governed' to exit from the framework of governmentality and its 'freedoms' which guarantee the smooth

23. See Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

functioning of liberal-capitalist society. To exit governmentality means at once to produce a subjective 'mutation' and to enter the dynamics of the confrontation between adversaries, where another type of 'freedom' begins to emerge. Once the injunction to be 'governed', to be 'the governed', is lifted, what surges forth from the rupture is a freedom and a subjectivity that affirms itself as 'outside-and-against' capitalist freedoms. The 'non-relation' is no longer passively suffered, but acted and insisted upon by the dominated. The critical point is, as always, the passage from freedoms and subjectivations 'within-against' governmentality to freedoms 'outside-and-against' capitalism, those implied in strategic confrontations. In the passage between these two conflicts, between these two freedoms and these two subjectivations, it is the revolutionary rupture that is at work. It is here that the war machine, and an autonomous and independent subjectivity, is constituted – or fails to be constituted.

The movements of the 1960s fully assumed the rupture and discontinuity between these two modalities of conflict, subjectivity, and freedom. 1968 sounded the death knell for the Leninist machine and, more generally, for a way of understanding the subject and activism anchored in the Marxist tradition. The new movements were constituted upon entirely different temporalities than those of the classic workers' movement, involving other processes of subjectivation and other modes of organization. And here lies the importance of the feminist movement, which interrogates in unprecedented fashion the question of the subject, that of time, and that of the relation between the two – but without yet creating the coordinates of a new war machine.

In the early 1970s Carla Lonzi set out the rupture with the Leninist and, more generally, Marxist war machine very clearly, in a twofold manner. She declared that the subject is at once not given, since it is 'unexpected', and that the temporality of

the feminist movement is not that of the future, but that of the 'present'. With her concept of the 'unexpected subject' (*soggetto imprevisto*), Lonzi had in her sights the working class qua subjectivation expected, known and recognized in advance. For Marxism, in accordance with Hegel, the revolutionary process consists in the passage from the 'in itself' to the 'for itself', from unreflective immediacy to existence both subjective (consciousness) and objective (its real existence in the world). Instead, Lonzi writes in *Sputiamo su Hegel (Let's Spit on Hegel)*, 'Not being trapped within the master-slave dialectic, we ... introduce into the world the Unexpected Subject.'²⁴

The Marxist revolution introduces a discontinuity with 'power', but maintains the continuity of the 'subject' of the revolution. The working class already expresses a productive cooperation that is in itself 'revolutionary', whose only failing is that it is exploited and limited by the power of capital. Once liberated from these constraints, it could realize all of the promise it harbours. The revolution is apprehended as a realization of possibilities that are already contained in production, work and cooperation. These possibilities are 'tendencies' that revolutionary acceleration will allow to be *realized*. But the movements of the 1960s had an entirely different experience, since they arrived after two world wars forming one *total* world war, when this illusion of revolutionary production (of production as revolutionary in itself), the illusion of the already-in-act 'worker' subject, and that of science and technics as progressive forces, had been belied by the identity of production and destruction, of labour and war, of science and nuclear death. Acceleration has passed and is *passed* – rendered *passé* – by total war, whose perspective capital adopts, with the 'real

24. Carla Lonzi, 'Sputiamo su Hegel' (1970), in *Sputiamo su Hegel: La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale e altri scritti*, Milan: Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1974; Edizione Economica, 2013, p. 47.

subsumption' of society and of its 'productive forces' at the price of an unlimited war. So much so that production, labour and subjectivity no longer harbour any image of the future, any promise of emancipation in the mirror of the revolution. They must be subjected to radical mutations. The process of the realization of (possible) tendencies remains, still, a realization of history subtended by a more or less veiled teleology. The reality of labour, of cooperation and of production trace and anticipate the future. And if the temporality of the revolution is that of the future, it is the future that is *past*.²⁵

If, on the contrary, the subject is 'unexpected' (*imprévu*), its construction is carried out on the basis of the present and not that of a time to come. The future remains a promise which cannot be experienced, whereas the present is the temporality of rupture, the here and now which opens up the process of the active destruction of stereotypes of subjectivation – for Lonzi, in particular, 'feminine' subjectivity. 'Presente, non futuro', it reads in a manifesto of Rivolta Femminile.²⁶ The present is the moment of the emergence of an unknown, unexpected sensibility that bears within itself the potential for new forms of existence impossible to conceive before they actually come forth, which 'introduce discontinuity into our very being', as Foucault writes in 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'.²⁷ There is no teleology, but only the reality of struggles, of confrontations and strategies that determine the passage to being, in a 'processual creativity', as Guattari says.²⁸ In which case, putting 'politics before being', with Deleuze and Guattari,²⁹ would mean putting strategy before

25. See Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe, Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 1985.

26. See *È Già Politica*, ed. Marta Lonzi, Anna Jaquinta, Carla Lonzi, Milan: Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1977. See also the very end of *Sputiamo su Hegel*, with its strong Benjaminian resonance: 'There are no goals, there is the present of our here and now. We are the world's dark past, we are giving shape to the present' (p. 48).

27. Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', p. 88.

28. Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*, Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 13.

29. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, New York: Continuum,

ontology. For this rupture with history, with the subject, with the promises (always yet to be realized) of labour, production, science and technology, does away with neither power relations nor war.

But after '68, the 'movement' – or movements – proved incapable of facing up to the total social war that they themselves had helped instigate. And, in its turn, capital, faced with the strange revolution of '68, would in the 1970s launch an equally strange world financial 'counter-revolution' that adapted the intensity of war and civil war to the force of what it was confronting on a global scale: a first alter-globalization movement placed under the sign of the political re-emergence of class, race, sex and subjectivity wars, which the 'working class' could no longer subordinate to its 'objective interests' or to its specific forms of organization (parties and unions). The subjectivities of the strange revolution of '68 revealed themselves incapable of thinking and organizing war machines that could hold together the break with both capitalism and socialism, and the confrontation with the strategic offensives and power relationships that capital was in the process of reconfiguring under the rubric of neoliberalism. Emancipation and autonomy must be affirmed politically and safeguarded against the initiative of an enemy that always acts on the twofold plane of relation (governor/governed) and non-relation (war). In short, the movements of '68 found themselves in an impasse which we are far from having escaped: when they directly confronted the war of capital, they adopted Marxist–Leninist modes of organization; and when they instead explored modes of subjectivation, bypassing the dialectical operation of contradiction, they abandoned the question of the construction of a new revolutionary war machine reconfigured for what Nietzsche called 'effective'

2004: *'before Being there is politics'* (p. 203).

history (*wirkliche Historie*). The same weakness is to be found on the theoretical level.

Unlike Marxism, *la pensée 68* was able to grasp the new relation between time and subjectivity, which it thought in terms of the 'event'. But the ethico-aesthetic turn of subjective 'conversion' in Foucault, of the 'production of subjectivity' in Guattari, and of 'emancipation' in Rancière, were radically severed from the question of the 'political revolution' and the construction of an anti-capitalist war machine which, not having war as its object (according to Deleuze and Guattari's famous proposition exemplifying the conversion of the power of division into a power of connection), would be unable of thinking afresh and engaging with the question of strategic confrontations. Without the war against capital and a new thinking of antagonism, the relation to self, the production of subjectivity and emancipation become 'recuperable' by capitalism's industry of 'self-transformation', which ensures a ready supply of 'human capital'.

On the fiftieth anniversary of '68, we are still at the same impasse. Subjective mutation and political revolution, self-relation, production of subjectivity and self-transformation, on the one hand, and strategic confrontation, on the other hand, must be held together in a relation of forces that can then be reversed. The event as 'the reversal of a relationship of forces' – this was the post-Marxist definition of the 'event' proposed by Foucault in 1971.³⁰ For we are also celebrating the 150th anniversary of the publication of the first volume of *Capital* and its 'flirtation with Hegel' (as Marx put it). Let us conclude by recalling Foucault's 'diagnosis', in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, in the tutelary shadow of Hyppolite: 'To really escape from Hegel assumes an appreciation of exactly what it

30. Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', p. 88.

costs to detach yourself from him.³¹ This is something that, for our part, we have tried to think and to problematize in *Wars* [after Foucault] and *Capital* [after Marx, and after Deleuze and Guattari's never-renounced Marxism].³²

31. Michel Foucault, 'The Order of Discourse', trans. I. McLeod, in Robert Young, ed., *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 74.

32. Éric Alliez and Maurizio Lazzarato, *Wars and Capital*, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2018.